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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) work the Austrian energy
company OMV pursued as it constructed a gas power plant on the shores of the Black
Sea. I argue that neither social movement theory nor CSR theory fully explain what
happened in this case. Environmental protests quickly became embedded in local
politics and national identity figurations, and the CSR work by the company was
transformed and domesticated by local actors. While agency and power was thus
distributed, various actors also shared a common language, tapping into a globally
circulating discourse that has gained traction in Turkey with the current neoliberal
policies. The way CSR was played out and negotiated in this case meant that social
capital and equity were construed as issues of concern, while environmental issues
were downplayed. Thus, in the process, the double bind between the growth
economy and ecologies of survival was effectively reproduced.
KEYWORDS Social movements; corporate ethics; energy; environmentalism; Turkey: Black Sea.
Turkey is currently experiencing one of the world’s highest increases in the consump-
tion of hydrocarbons for energy. This increase is taking place within a neoliberal policy
that privileges the investment and involvement of transnational energy companies in
the domestic Turkish economy. These companies also often bring novel management
and communication strategies that foster new kinds of relationships with authorities
and local communities. This study focuses on the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) work the Austrian energy company OMV pursued in the region surrounding
its newly constructed gas power plant on the shores of the Black Sea. I argue that
neither social movement theory nor CSR theory fully explain what happened in this
case as environmental protests quickly became embedded in local politics and national
identity figurations, and the CSR work by the company was transformed and domesti-
cated by local factionalism, corruption and identity politics.
This article first reviews the anthropological literature on social movements and CSR
before outlining recent developments in Turkish energy policy. This is followed by a
description of how the CSR policies of the company mainly concerned public relations.
I show that, to some extent, the company’s CSR policies reduced the local population’s
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opposition to the power plant; but in the next section, I argue that the major reason for
the impotence of the environmental movement’s opposition to the plant was the diffi-
culty of mobilising ‘above politics’ in a context where there is so much sensitivity about
separatism, fatherland, political and ethno-religious identities. In the last section, I
describe how local actors came to domesticate the energy company’s CSR policies in
their effort to have the company construct a teachers’ college. This article is based
upon material gathered in the period 2010–2013 and includes ethnographic fieldwork
and interviews in Terme and Ünye on the Turkish Black Sea coast in 2011 and 2013
(totalling eight weeks), an extensive survey of national and especially local news
outlets (print as well as Internet), of social media, as well as popular books (in
Turkish) on environmental movements.
Anthropologies of social movements and CSR
Studies of social movements have deep roots in sociology. Since the 1960s, attention has
focused on ‘new social movements’ (see Della Porta & Diani 1999, cited in Wastl-
Walter 2001), including environmental NGOs. This approach focuses on the transfor-
mative potential of resistance and popular protest among ‘marginal’ groups (e.g.
Escobar 1992). Thus, social movements are commonly regarded as providing potential
for change, for trying out new ideas of social arrangements and are often considered
defenders of place (Escobar et al. 2002).
In a critical review of the social movements literature, Edelman (2001) notes that
many anthropologists tend to associate themselves with, and study, only one social
movement, preferably one they feel sympathetic towards. This, claims Edelman, can
be problematic: ‘How are we to understand movements…which we may, in fact, not
like at all?’ (2001: 311). The apparent congruence between social movement perspec-
tives and the ethnographer’s view can be problematic if it is not sufficiently balanced
with a reflexive discussion of the justification and implications (Knudsen 2014).
Edelman calls for more attention to ‘the broader social field’ (Edelman 2001: 311)
and ‘greater sensitivity to the historical and cultural processes’ (2001: 309) as well as
internal cleavages or differences within social movements.
While social movement theory generally stresses the creativity of activism, anthro-
pological approaches to CSR, on the other hand, tend to emphasise the way companies’
CSR policies establish a hegemonic frame for a ‘universal’ morality that focuses on
citizen responsibility, partnership, entrepreneurship and vision. Attempting to trans-
form the character of interaction from one of conflict to collaboration, corporations
increasingly try to address local populations’ and environmental activists’ concerns
about a project’s environmental impact by including such issues into the companies’
‘corporate ethics’ (Rajak 2011). Other scholars have focused on the capacity of such cor-
porate-community partnerships to provide new channels/vehicles for patronage, elite-
acting/corruption, and dependency and control (Jones 2007; Welker 2009; Rajak 2011).
One major claim emerging from the ethnographies of corporate ethics is that transna-
tional corporations (TNCs), particularly within the energy sector, increasingly bypass
the state through local enclaving (Ferguson 2005) or partnership with non-state
actors (Gardner 2012). CSR, as practiced by most TNCs, has also been considered neo-
liberal governmentality, ‘a political mode of optimisation, whose flexibility allows it to
be modified to suit context’ … ‘generating a transfer of the operations of government to
non-governmental entities’ (Hilgers 2010: 359).
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Although there are exceptions, the anthropological literature on CSR tends to focus
on what kind of work the language and practice of CSR does for the corporations, how
CSR policies help corporations smoothen relations with local communities and auth-
orities, and how corporations’ CSR work, in effect, substitute for state roles in society.
There are some distinct differences in the ways in which anthropologists have
addressed social movements and CSR, respectively. With the underlying assumption
being that CSR is a hegemonic discourse which, within a neoliberal context, privileges
the interest of TNCs, CSR is usually approached with a critical distance. The task of
anthropology is perceived to be to de-mask or deconstruct the CSR discourse, not to
learn from or engage with companies’ CSR policies. Nor does this perspective enable
us to see how CSR may be claimed from below and even become a resource for
(some) local interests and agendas. The underlying assumption concerning social
movements, on the other hand, tends to be that they are harbingers of new creative
visions, sites of hope and progressive development in the face of oppressive states
and capitalism. The anthropologist’s role is perceived to be to engage with, learn
from and support this potential, as articulated explicitly by Escobar, not to explore
these social movements critically (Escobar 2008; see also Knudsen 2014). Both
approaches are concerned with the creation of social change, but whereas studies of
CSR tend to consider agency as being ‘top-down’, agency is more regarded as (reactive)
‘bottom-up’ in studies of social movements.
One may ask whether this non-symmetrical approach to these two topics is sound or
not. Politically it may seem wise, but epistemologically it may be problematic. If we put
the political motive in parentheses, for the time being, may we ask other questions, learn
new things? What if we take the ontologies of CSR and those developed by social move-
ments seriously, but also explore how they work in the world, interrogate what effects
the policies might have (cf. Ferguson’s 2009 study of ‘the uses of neoliberalism’), and
investigate how they are framed by different actors and in different contexts? By
accounting for a wider social field, history and identities (pace Edelman 2001), I am
thus aiming here for a more nuanced analysis of both social movements and CSR. I
will hold that agency can be more distributed than what anthropological approaches
to both social movements and CSR tend to assume, and that framings of both CSR
and social movement action can be multiple and contested. Both social movements
and CSR can thus emerge as ‘learning spaces’1 from which tactics can be appropriated
by different kinds of actors.
In line with this thinking I tried, in fieldwork, to relate to the full range of relevant
actors. I realised that my research assistant, who first tried to explore this case, assumed
that she could ascertain the whole truth about the conflict by talking only with ‘political
comrades’ on the political left. I cast a wider net and, while staying at a local guesthouse
for 6 weeks all told, interacted informally with people in the flow of life, especially
around the guesthouse. I also sought out and interviewed and chatted with environmen-
talists and local opposition (primary focus in 2011), company representatives and local
authorities (primary focus in 2013), as well as locals in both Terme and Ünye who had
no particular stance on the issue. Thus, I talked with and sometimes took part in the
activities of fishers, journalists, local teachers and academicians, village heads, the
mayor and staff at the Kozluk Municipality, plant management – in particular those
responsible for CSR – and local staff of CSR-funded activities. I also visited many
tea-houses where I discussed the power plant with local men.
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In many cases interlocutors would take me on ‘walkabouts’ (of the Municipality, the
power plant, a village). I presented myself as a social scientist doing research on the con-
flict concerning the power plant and the CSR policies of the corporation. My long
research experience in Turkey (focusing especially on Black Sea fisheries), my
mastery of Turkish as a second language, my relative seniority, as well as the fact
that I could get around in a rented car gave me a certain status and access. As a foreigner
I was also less exposed to being labelled as belonging to any particular identity configur-
ation (such as ‘leftist sociologist’, a common stereotype in Turkey). While most inter-
locutors thus seemed to position me as a relatively neutral researcher, my interaction
with a wide variety of actors may have also resulted in breadth at the sacrifice of
depth. This, however, was a conscious choice made so as to understand the complexity
of the dynamics involved in the contest surrounding the power plant.
Neoliberal energy in Turkey
In government and business circles in Turkey, a sense of urgency in increasing Turkish
energy production is often articulated. Three main reasons are cited: a growing popu-
lation, increasing consumption per capita to support economic and welfare develop-
ment, and Turkey’s high dependency on energy imports. Energy is thus considered
of core importance to the Turkish developmentalist model, and economic growth
and dynamism are seen as depending on continued growth in energy consumption,
which is expected to double from 2010 to 2020 (Demir 2010). Thus, when the
Turkish energy and electricity sector, almost totally state-owned and controlled in
the 1980s, was one of the first sectors in Turkey that saw real neoliberal reform, the
rationale was not public inefficiency, but ‘inability of the government to meet [the
increased] demand through public investments’ (Togan & Sevaioğlu 2010: 108). In
1999, the Constitution was amended to facilitate privatisation of public assets; new
laws, including the Electricity Market Law of 2001, opened up the whole energy
sector for competition; state-owned energy companies involved in import, refining, dis-
tribution and production of energy were privatised; and private companies – including
foreign – were invited to invest in new energy producing projects. Attracted by the fact
that Turkey is considered to be one of the fastest growing energy markets in the world,
the energy sector is now ‘drawing the largest amount of private domestic and foreign
investment in Turkey’ (McBDC 2013: 3). The strategic importance of the sector is
also manifested by the reaffirmation by the parliament in 2012 of the 1983 law that sti-
pulates that there is no right to strike in the petrol and energy sector, underscoring how
closely interwoven the ‘growth economy’, hydrocarbons, and political control are in
contemporary Turkey (cf. Mitchell 2011).
These policies have facilitated a massive increase in the construction of electricity
production and in energy infrastructure since the early 2000s (Fırat 2016). Overall,
Turkish energy consumption is very carbon-dependent, with hydrocarbons accounting
for 90% of total energy consumption (EÜAŞ 2013: 11) and more than 50% of electricity
production2. Natural gas plays an increasing role as its consumption increased approxi-
mately 150% from 2002 to 2012 and constitutes 44% of (2013) electricity production.
Household consumption of gas is also of increasing importance. In January 2014, 28
gas power plants were under construction, while five new gas power plants started pro-
duction in 2013, one of which is the Austrian OMV plant in Terme (EÜAŞ 2013: 12–
14), which provides approximately 3% of Turkish energy production. Some of these
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energy developments have a significant impact on environment and livelihoods and are
often met with local resistance (Knudsen 2016).
In addition to the importance of energy to Turkey’s continued economic growth,
Turkey also holds a central geopolitical position in the energy corridor between
Europe and fossil fuel-producing countries to the east. This probably impacts the
way foreign energy companies consider investments in Turkey. For instance, OMV
saw its investment in previously state-owned Petrol Ofisi – the largest network of
petrol stations in Turkey – and in the gas power plant on the shores of the Turkish
Black Sea coast in the context of its previous investments in Romania and in its
(majority) share in the (now aborted) plans for a gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to
Austria. At the same time, Turkey depends on gas imports from Russia via the Blue
Stream gas pipeline that lands in Samsun on the Black Sea coast and which also provides
the gas for OMV’s new energy plant.
The power plant and OMV’s CSR work
In October 2009, construction started on the 890 MW power plant in the village of
Akçay in the District of Terme, Province of Samsun (Figure 1). Objections to the con-
struction of the plant revolved around three major issues: the plant being constructed
on good agricultural land, air pollution and the heating of seawater. No concern was
voiced over emissions of climate-affecting gases and global warming, reflecting a
general lack of attention to these issues in the public debate on energy, which is over-
determined by the developmentalist aim to increase energy production.
When asked about their CSR policies in 2013, one manager at the OMV power plant
told me that considering that they had started late and poorly, they had been ‘extremely
successful’. There were significant problems related to empty promises, misinformation
etc., before OMV took the company over from other owners in 2009; but with their new
policies, OMV’s relationship to the community had become fairly good. This statement
shows how strongly CSR policies are related to public relations. Indeed, the title of the
officer at the power plant responsible for their CSR policies is ‘Administrative and
Figure 1. Map of Terme – Ünye region, location of power plant.
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Community Relations Manager’, and the officer responsible for CSR at their main office
in Istanbul holds the title ‘Director of Corporate Communications and Public
Relations’.
In 2010, OMV’s public relations officer in Istanbul, together with the leader of the
power plant sub-company, launched a public relations effort in Samsun, telling the
press that they ‘had undertaken a dense program to remove anxieties concerning the
power plant’. They also stressed the importance of being ‘open and transparent’ and
that CSR (sosyal sorumluluk) was in the front seat of the company’s policies. In practice,
this public relations effort involved taking businessmen and other locals to visit a gas-
fired power plant in Bursa for people to see for themselves the minimal damage the
plant was inflicting on the environment. The efforts also included organising public
information meetings, sponsoring a positive review in a local monthly journal3 and
visits to local authorities, businessmen, the university and NGOs. These efforts paid
off. For instance, stories circulated about an elderly peasant being sceptical about the
power plant, but changing his opinion when learning from another peasant near the
power plant in Bursa that the bees – ‘the most sensitive creatures’ – were still
around. An Akçay Facebook group that initially carried many sceptical comments
about the power plant gradually changed character during late 2009 and early 2010
as locals gradually came around to support the constructıon going on right across
the road from their village.
The power plant’s Administrative and Community Relations Manager started to
develop a range of different CSR initiatives. OMV brought youth from Terme to par-
ticipate in the OMV Rapid Wien Football Camp in Istanbul; they arranged and
funded a sports summer school for children and youth in Ünye; they bought equipment
for the Kozluk Municipality and arranged energy seminars in Kozluk; and financially
supported a range of activities, such as: a 75,000 Euro prize for the best project in
‘Energy Research’ at the OMÜ university in Samsun; money for flood victims in the
city of Samsun (120,000 TRY); a circumcision ceremony for 100 boys in Ünye;
smaller projects in surrounding villages, and a women’s weaving project in Ünye.
In an effort to decentralise the way CSR was done, OMV established the Kozluk
Development Alliance (Kozluk Gelişme Birliği) through which 0.17 million Euro was
distributed during the plant’s construction phase. OMV accepts some initiatives by
the people they have engaged to staff their two offices, but largely maintains control
over the operations of the alliance. A document posted on the OMV webpages states
that ‘in order to integrate itself into the community and identify and meet community
needs, OMV joined the “Kozluk Community Resources Partnership”’.4 Through rewrit-
ing the name of the association and by claiming that it was already there, OMVmade an
attempt to demonstrate that they adapt to the local communities, whereas OMV was
actually instrumental in creating the ‘partnership’.
This text is interesting in as much as it is directed at an international readership and
very explicitly conveys the globally circulating CSR language. OMV here typically
employs a vocabulary that promotes certain techniques of the self (neoliberal subjectiv-
ities) (Hilgers 2010: 358): OMV ‘ … is looking forward to being a responsible partner in
local projects that promote sustainable development. This will represent a real win-win-
win situation for the community, the authorities, and OMV’ (see Note 4). The text
abounds with formulations such as ‘partnership’, ‘foster entrepreneurship, leadership,
and vision’, ‘care’, ‘grievance system’, ‘transparently’, ‘dialogue’, ‘trust’, ‘mutual
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understanding’, ‘neighbours’ and even claims that ‘OMV encourages young talents to
become future stars’ (see Note 4).
Thus, OMV is bringing an internationally informed understanding of CSR to the
Turkish scene. Already during the 1970s, scholars in Turkey who were inspired by
American approaches to corporate ethics started writing about CSR, but the big corpor-
ations only started to pick up the language of CSR in the 1990s and 2000s (Yamak
2007). Ararat and Göcenoğlyu (2005: 11) consider that ‘excluding the philanthropic
activities, the very first manifestations of CSR were observed in the business conduct
of multinational/global companies in Turkey’, and illustrate this with BP’s CSR work
related to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline (see also Barry 2013). Öztüran (2011) has explored
how companies and NGOs perceive and implement the concept of CSR (Kurumsal
Sosyal Sorumluluk) and concludes that the companies’ cooperation with and economic
support for vakıf (foundation) NGOs has increased. Philanthropy is still the dominant
form of CSR in Turkey, and, overall, ‘CSR in Turkey has not moved beyond a public
relations matter in Turkish companies’ (Ararat & Göcenoğlyu 2005: 9), which finds
its expression, among other things, in the fact that in the large Turkish corporations,
CSR is usually handled by their communications departments (iletişim) (Öztüran
2011).
OMV’s approach to CSR seems to be a mix of Turkish tradition and international
standards for CSR, that is, not donating to vakıf, but supporting education, research,
sports and culture in the communities neighbouring the power plant, paying particular
attention to public image. In their interaction with the community and stakeholders in
Samsun and Turkey, OMV representatives explicitly refer to ‘their CSR’ or the Turkish
equivalent ‘(kurumsal) sosyal sorumluluk’ policies, such as in the Turkish PowerPoint
presentation shown to visitors, or in the plant management’s statements to the press.
CSR has become a well-known language in Turkey during the last few years, a language
that local actors can relate to as well, and which signifies ‘modern’ ways of doing things.
Thus, what the local OMVmanagement themselves see as public relations work is often
externally presented as CSR activity.
OMV’s CSR policy clearly contributed to improving OMV’s public image, bringing
many locals over to their side. However, CSR policies here must be seen as part of a large
ensemble of benefits that OMV provides to the surrounding communities: The oppor-
tunities for employment, contracts (many sub-contracts were handed to local entrepre-
neurs) and business opportunities in general were at least as important as CSR and
public relations policies in getting local people to support the power plant construction.
An important reason the local population accepted the power plant construction was
the fact that local leaders – all representing the AKP – came out early in support of the
power plant. AKP – the moderate Islamist party that has been in power since 2002 – has
a very strong hold over the population in the District of Terme (garnering 70% of the
vote in 2011 parliamentary elections). The village headman in Akçay vocally opposed
activists coming to Akçay to collect signatures on a petition against the power plant,
while the major of Kozluk also supported the construction of the power plant.
Common for these two leaders was that they saw the potential in using OMV-resources
for furthering their own careers. The Akçay village head became one of the major local
sub-contractors during the construction of the power plant, used the profits to invest in
a petrol station/restaurant, and also became one of the main contractors when the con-
struction of the teachers’ college in Kozluk eventually started.
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Environmental protest5
Considering the scale of the construction and the massive protests that some other
energy projects in this region have been met with, protests against the OMV power
plant have been relatively feeble. In exploring the reasons for this, I emphasise the
importance of wider social fields and identities, particularly arguing that environment-
alism in Turkey can only be understood in the context of national identity- and party
politics.
The literature on environmentalism in Turkey tends to stress its newness and crea-
tivity. Scholars have argued that environmentalism, often supported by transnational
networks, contributes to ‘maturing’ Turkish society and politics, including the
opening up of a richer civil society, the claiming of new civilian rights and the fostering
of alternative expressions of identity. The stress on newness and creativity for environ-
mental protests seems also to have found resonance among activists themselves. They
often emphasise that environmental protests mobilise previously politically passive vil-
lages, change gender roles and establish new kinds of social relations. One of the most
notable of these claims to newness is that the resistance is ‘above politics’ (siyasi üstü).
In practice, ‘above politics’ seems to mean trying to mobilise a range of different actors
and organisations in a common effort, often including political parties across the pol-
itical spectrum. ‘Above politics’ may also mean above identity divisions such as ‘left’-
‘right’ or Sunni-Alevi.
However, my research assistant (Özlem Yeniay) and I have found that, in practice,
mobilising ‘above politics’ can be very challenging in many places in the Turkish Black
Sea region. This was also the case in two different initiatives to form ‘above politics’
environmental platforms in Terme and in Ünye to protest the construction of the
OMV power plant.
In 2009, NGOs, each close to political parties or clearly positioned in the ideological
landscape, came together across political divisions in Terme to form a ‘platform’ to
protest the planned power plant. During a public meeting in Terme, they arranged
for members of the ultra-nationalists to shout ‘Do not sell our fatherland (Vatanımız
satmayın)!’, which is considered a strong articulation of an ultra-nationalist position
in Turkey, and to which leftists react strongly. Criticism from within the ranks of
both sides was directed towards those of their own who had participated with their
adversaries in this joint effort. After the public meeting, the platform in Terme did
not arrange any further activities and disintegrated. In addition to conflict within the
platform, they also received little local support, even among local fishers who would
likely be among those most affected by the power plant.
In Ünye, protests against the OMV power plant started later and were independent
of the protests in Terme. The first mobilisation spanned a wider range of actors than in
Terme, from ‘housewives’ to journalists, fishers to academicians, and those with politi-
cal positions from the far left to far right. Together they formed the loose platform,
TÜÇEP,6 which, during the spring of 2011, arranged a variety of activities. The
broad base of the platform also proved to be a challenge as tensions soon emerged
between groups and individuals who had not worked together before, did not know
each other, and held very different views as to which symbols would best represent
the nation and the threats to it. Several incidents strained the collaboration – among
other things, people with right-wing inclinations did not want to come to meetings
arranged in the leftist teachers’ union offices, and one ultra-nationalist accused the
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spokesperson of TÜÇEP of being a PKK7 supporter. The platform managed to file a
lawsuit against the OMV power plant construction, but the lawsuit was only signed
by 12 plaintiffs – far from the over 100 they, according to the lawyer representing
them, had envisaged. The lawyer noted that ‘I can say that we did not manage to get
people in Ünye together as much as we aimed for. I’d say we were unsuccessful’.
In May 2011, the State Council, somewhat unexpectedly, ruled in favour of the plain-
tiffs. When construction continued unabated as legal ambiguities made unclear whose
responsibility it was to implement the ruling stopping construction, TÜÇEP mobilised
in order to bring attention to the deadlock, but this time without the ultra-nationalists,
fishers or academicians. Locally only a hard-core leftist group remained. This group
used their leftist network beyond Ünye when mobilising for a protest in front of the
OMV power plant in February, 2012. Overall, there was very little local participation
in this protest.
A representative of another environmental group in Ünye accused the protesters
outside the power plant in February, 2012 of being supporters of PKK, claiming that
he ‘saw the separatist organisation’s scarves’. This resulted in the leaders of the two
groups falling out with each other in the local press. The criticism was, if taken literally,
unfounded. The alleged yellow scarves of the separatists were actually the ‘yellow print’
(sarı yazma) scarves used by women in a village in Kastamonu in Northwestern Turkey
and carried as a symbol by the activists from the Loç Valley. However, the incident
shows that there is extreme sensitivity concerning separatism, especially in the Black
Sea region.
Both in Terme and in Ünye, mobilisation against the power plant initially endea-
voured to be ‘above politics’. This ideal disintegrated when confronted with local poli-
tics, the distinction between the majority Sunnis and the Alevi sect, and concerns about
separatism, which are related to political and cultural processes on a larger, especially
national, scale. Rather than stimulating new ways of organising, new relations, and
‘above politics’mobilisation, protests in Ünye and Terme eventually consolidated estab-
lished identities and lines of conflict, limiting their ability to effectively work against the
construction of the power plant.
In Turkey, identity issues and party politics are pervasive to the point that the pol-
itical stance of even environmental activists becomes a major concern. Activists are
caught in a dilemma where they have to tread very carefully to avoid accusations of
being separatists or betrayers of the fatherland (vatan haini). Environmental protest
has become ‘politicised’ from many sides, not least by the government’s approach to
environmental protest. This indeed happened during the Gezi Park protests in June
2013, when a small environmentalist protest against the planned felling of trees in a
park adjacent to the central Taksim Square in Istanbul developed into mass mobilis-
ations around the country of a broad coalition of all groups opposing the AKP govern-
ment. The issues at stake went well beyond environmental concerns, with police
violence in particular provoking mass mobilisation in most major cities. In his ‘National
Will’ speech in Ankara the day before the Gezi Park was ‘emptied’ by the security forces
in June 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan characterised the occupiers of the park as an
‘organisation’ (örgüt),8 and the protests as a ‘dirty play, a vile trap, treasonous
attacks’.9 Since powerful actors within and beyond the state have much influence
over these identity configurations, they can to a large extent impact the frames for inter-
preting and assessing environmental protest. The concerns about the fatherland, about
separatism and strangers, and the configuration of identities that I saw manifesting in
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Terme-Ünye are not just ‘traditional’ local culture there to be read and interpreted, but
have been created, shaped, provoked and manipulated by outside forces, especially sec-
tions of the state (see Knudsen 2016). With the addition of (Sunni) Islam to the still
prevailing Kemalist identity-territory-enemies configuration, large sections of the
Turkish Black Sea population embrace, and are loyal to, the Turkish state.
With this strong configuration in place, with the government’s consistent labelling of
environmentalists as betrayers of the fatherland, and with leftist groups’ effort to appro-
priate the social and political energies of environmental movements for their fight
against the state, the AKP and capitalism, the inherent potential of creativity and
newness that comes with environmental protest is largely derailed and unsuccessful,
as in Terme and Ünye. Thus, the ‘pacification’ of environmental protest against the
power plant was only to some extent a result of CSR or public relation efforts by
OMV, and more a result of the difficulty of mobilising ‘above politics’ in a context
where there is so much sensitivity about separatism, fatherland and political and
ethno-religious identities.
David domesticating Goliath
Besides the environmental issues, the Kozluk mayor’s effort to have OMV construct a
five million Euro Teachers College has been the most contentious issue in OMV’s inter-
action with the surrounding communities. The sequence of events that ultimately led to
the construction of the school shows the extent to which OMV was forced to adapt its
CSR policies to local politics. Two factors made this possible: the legal framework that
gave the mayor considerable leverage in sanctioning OMV, and the mayor’s as well as
the local population’s skilful use of and impact on public opinion through active use of
local and social media.
In 2009, the area on which the plant was being constructed was transferred to the
Kozluk municipality, in effect giving local authorities stronger legal rights to sanction
OMV’s activities. This municipality had elected a new mayor earlier that year, the ener-
getic Şenol Kul, who had a university education and experience from business and
longer stays abroad. The major was in favour of the construction, but also saw the
potential to gain resources from OMV. In December 2009, the preparations for the con-
struction started with ground works and the erection of administrative buildings. Şenol
Kul did not wait long before he acted: In February 2010, he locked up and sealed the
construction site since the company had not acquired the necessary licences. The
company duly undertook the necessary paperwork within the one-month period they
were given, the seal was removed and construction continued. Interestingly, a few
months later, OMV provided Kozluk Municipality with a range of ‘urgently needed
equipment’ (see Note 4). Although there exists no record of the deal, seen in light of
later developments, it is likely that the mayor used the closure to force OMV to
support his municipality with the equipment.
In August 2010, the mayor brought the Teachers College to the agenda for the first
time. Local management of OMV had figured that providing food for the fast-breaking
meals during Ramadan in communities in Kozluk and Akçay was a proper way, in
accordance with local tradition, of showing their commitment to the communities.
However, this backfired. Although wealthy patrons are expected to support their neigh-
bours and employees during religious festivals, such support can also be considered as
bribery, which another power plant construction in the region had earlier experienced
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(Telatar 2008: 31). In a rather harshly worded statement to the local press, the Kozluk
mayor criticised OMV’s CSR offer for support during Ramadan as being not ‘social
responsibility’ but rather ‘social irresponsibility’. He stated that as ‘citizens of the
Turkish Republic, a first class world nation, we are not beggars’ and do not want (con-
descending) favours (lütüf). Rather, he expected greater visions from a wealthy global
company and suggested that this could be realised with OMV sponsoring the construc-
tion of a Teachers College or an Energy Vocational College. From Istanbul, OMVs Cor-
porate Communications and Public Affairs official responded that making a school in
Kozluk was ‘not on our agenda’.
At the power plant’s foundation-laying ceremony – delayed because of the disagree-
ment about the school – in front of the Turkish ministers, the Austrian Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the company leadership from Austria, and apparently to the sur-
prise of local OMV officials, the mayor repeated his demand for a Teachers College.
OMV finally gave in: only two days later, the company CEO in Austria gave the
green light. However, the game of tug of war between the mayor and OMV was not
over with this capitulation. Two months later, the mayor again addressed the press:
‘The company does not act on their promise, we are waiting for their next step’. He
wanted them to sign a protocol about the school. In February 2011, he again ordered
that the construction site be sealed. Negotiations between the parties continued and
in early April 2011, the protocol was finally signed. However, the uncertainty about
the future of the power plant created by the surprising decision by the State Council
in May 2011 likely made the OMV leadership wary about committing themselves to
making a major investment in the community and construction of the school was
again delayed.
Once more, the Kozluk mayor interfered in the work of OMV. Referring to the lack
of a proper licence, he sealed off the restaurant in which the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) meeting for OMV’s construction of transmission lines from the
power plant were to be held in August 2011. This got things moving. The Kozluk
mayor went to Austria and negotiated directly with the company leadership in Novem-
ber 2011. Unlike most mayors of small municipalities in Turkey, Şenol Kul speaks
English fluently and has extensive experience dealing with foreigners. The date for
the ‘laying the foundation’ ceremony for the school was set to February 2012.
However, on that date, construction still had not been started. The State Council
decision was reconfirmed twice, in late autumn 2011 and in May 2012, and the com-
pany’s appeal was finally rejected in February 2013. In late May 2013, the Ministry
for Energy and Natural Resources, turning the table, ruled that due to the fact that
the plant was already constructed and ‘in the interest of the public good’, OMV
could be allocated the licence that the court had retracted. Thereafter, electricity pro-
duction soon started. But OMV still did not commence construction of the school.
The mayor had also taken the initiative to set up several other projects in the small
township of only 3000 inhabitants: construction of and upgrading of roads, the laying
out of a new central square, an extensive irrigation project, a sports field and sports hall,
and the acquisition of an impressive selection of vehicles and equipment. He was very
conscious about this success, and openly boasted of this in local media. Also, when I
talked to him in September 2013, he conveyed this image of success: ‘Kozluk’, he
said, ‘has acquired a very nice image’. He stressed that, contrary to public opinion,
only the school was sponsored by OMV.
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Despite its small size, the Kozluk municipality became renowned within the Province
of Samsun, and the mayor famous beyond the province. He was selected to represent
Turkish municipalities at an EU-wide meeting about local governance. Many started
to speak about him as the preferred next mayor of the much larger Terme Municipality.
In September 2013, he married. People considered that ‘Erdoğan (the prime minister
and leader of the AKP) wouldn’t want an unmarried man (as AKP candidate)’. At
his formal wedding ceremony, the mayor of SamsunMetropolitan Municipality actually
conducted the wedding process, and one local commented to me that ‘everyone among
the bureaucrats are here, upper, lower and middle ranks. If he stands for election, it is
certain that he will win’. The day after, headlines in the local press read: ‘The political
world came together at the wedding’.
The mayor had a very conscious media strategy. When travelling around the town-
ship and villages, his assistant took photos of us in front of the important ‘projects’
while the mayor expertly arranged our standing and posture to make the best of the
photo (they considered doing a news item about my visit). The mayor had engaged
this assistant as a full-time media worker, producing news about Kozluk and the
mayor and maintaining the Facebook pages of the municipality. Şenol Kul spoke fre-
quently to the press about the need to ‘brand’ Kozluk and Terme, to have ‘projects’
and about the need for new and ambitious ‘visions’. To me he stressed that the devel-
opment should be based on science and should strive towards city life (şehir hayatı). All
in all, he expounded a ‘modern’ vision with little reference to Islam and more to
business culture, while also relying on well-proven local strategies for political mobilis-
ation, as seen with the strategic arrangement of the wedding. By the time he announced
that he would be standing for the AKP candidacy for the Terme Municipality, the con-
struction of the school had started and the ‘lay the foundation’ ceremony had been held.
As Şenol Kul campaigned, the school was built on the land he had donated and it played
a major role in the promotion of his candidacy during the campaign and his eventual
successful election. However, he was not alone in making sure that OMV actually kept
its word and started construction.
Since there had been no progress for a couple years on the school issue, people in
Akçay and Kozluk started to discuss this on Facebook, and on 12 July 2013, formed
the open Facebook group ‘OMV Kozluk we want our school’ which reached a member-
ship of 3000. The initiative was led by a bank ‘project manager’ in Istanbul hailing from
Kozluk, and many other members in the group were living outside of Terme, a few even
in Europe. Some group members were clearly well aware of the character of the inter-
national context within which OMV operates, and made their views explicit through
Facebook posts: ‘When multinational firms make investments in foreign countries,
their first rule is to be on good terms with the local population’; ‘Companies are
required to undertake CSR projects’.
This action was independent of the activities of the Kozluk mayor, and some
members in the group even questioned the mayor’s silence on the school issue.
Members in the group suggested a range of actions to attract attention to the issue,
most importantly planning for a demonstration in front of the power plant, for
which they also used Twitter.
A month after the launch of the Facebook group and only three days before the
planned demonstration, OMV declared to the local press that they would start the con-
struction of the school right after the upcoming religious festival of Eid. The Facebook
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group had reached its goal and was closed down. OMV finally kept their word. In
December 2013, a high profile and crowded ‘laying the foundation’ ceremony was held.
Conclusions
Corporate ethics did not play out quite as intended by the OMV. The company could
not control the CSR process, and local authorities – supported by popular mobilisation
– clearly had power to claim CSR from below, shape it to their needs and adapt it into
local politics and careers. The request for investment in a teachers college school came
as an unwelcome wildcard to OMV and resulted in an expenditure probably far beyond
what OMV had planned for and expected. Relations with the Kozluk mayor had appar-
ently been very strained. One manager at the power plant complained that ‘we paid
Kozluk Municipality 1000% more for the licence than what it is worth’, the
‘payment’ being the CSR efforts – primarily, the school. Meanwhile, CSR was less
important in addressing environmental concerns. Albeit OMV’s public relations
efforts did diminish concerns about its impact on local nature and human health, it
was the fact that the activists could not escape the polarised identity politics in
Turkey that made environmental protest difficult.
Thus, agency in this case is wielded not only by local ‘big men’, by OMV represen-
tatives and environmental activists, but also by a diffuse network of individuals within
and beyond Kozluk and Akçay. The basis for each kind of agency is different: legal,
capital, public opinion. For all, the public opinion is important. Posts on the ‘We
want our school’ Facebook page explicitly acknowledge this. And it is important for
them precisely because public relations are so important for OMV. Both the CSR dis-
course and social movements can have transformative power, but, in this case, these
powers were only realised to a limited extent, before being transformed and transmuted
by powerful local actors. The outcome of interaction between the company, local and
national authorities, and local population could not be anticipated either by conven-
tional CSR or social movements theory.
While CSR was created at the interface between company, authorities and local
population, CSR language was also flexible enough to accommodate the outcome: the
school – even though OMV long considered it outside of their OMV policies – was
post hoc presented as the archetypical OMV CSR policy. In a press statement from
OMV about the ‘lay the foundation’ ceremony for the school, the OMV Turkey CEO
stated that: ‘OMV has performed many different corporate social responsibility projects
especially in education and sports in Samsun so far, but the most important one of these
is “Kozluk OMV Anatolian Teachers College”’.10
There are intriguing parallels between the language of OMV and the language of the
mayor who led the campaign for the school. This is not because the mayor has learned
from or had adapted to OMV, but because they both tap into a globally circulating dis-
course that also has gained traction in Turkey with the current neoliberal policies. In
this language, ‘environmental concerns and climate justice are not… categories of sig-
nificance’ (Eriksen and Schober, this issue). Overall, the neoliberal policies pursued in
Turkey during the last decades, especially since 2000, set the scene for the sequence of
events in this case. First, the neoliberal energy policies made it attractive for OMV to
invest in the power plant. Second, the popularisation – even naturalisation - of a
certain ‘neoliberal’ way of talking about societal development facilitated simultaneously
both the mayor’s ‘visions’ about ‘branding’ and ‘projects’, and OMV’s language and
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practice of corporate ethics. Thus, neoliberalisation does not necessarily imply a mini-
malisation of state power, but can rather involve re-deployment of state power and
development of new governance techniques.
Other ways the Turkish authorities can be seen acting in this case points to the con-
tinued power and authority of certain sectors of the state, such as in the denouncing the
actions of environmentalists as separatism. Moreover, the overturning of the court
decision not to grant OMV its operating licence was allegedly a result of direct nego-
tiations between the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Austria.11 We may never know
for sure whether that is true or not, but it is very likely that some high-level international
negotiation was instrumental in finally granting OMV its licence to operate. CSR did, in
fact, oil the carbon economy, but, to a large extent, local actors impacted the amount
and quality of the ‘oil’. And – beyond the purview of conventional ethnography – it
may be the case that the ‘anointing’ of officials at a higher level was perhaps more criti-
cal. Nevertheless, the way CSR was played out and negotiated in this case meant that
social capital and equity were construed as issues of concern, while environmental
issues were downplayed. Thus, in the process, the double bind between the growth
economy and ecologies of survival was effectively reproduced.
Notes
1. I am indebted to Elisabeth Schober for this suggestion.
2. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources web 12.12.14.
3. ‘Akçay’dan Ünye ve Terme’ye Asitil Yağmur Yağmayacak’ (Acid Rain from Akçay [the power
plant] Will Not Fall in Ünye and Terme), Canik, Volume 1, İssue 2, April-May 2010.
4. ‘Stakeholder Involvement and Community Relations with regard to the Samsun CCPP’, OMV




5. This section is based on a fuller discussion of the issue in Knudsen (2016), which the reader can
also consult for relevant references.
6. Temiz Ünye Çevre Platformu - Clean Ünye Environment Platform.
7. Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a military and political organisation
that since 1984 has been involved in armed struggle for Kurdish rights in Turkey.
8. In Türkey örgüt is often used as a synonym for PKK or illegal organisations.
9. ‘Bakan’dan çevrecilere savaş’, Milliyet Gazetesi 3. April 2012. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/
haber/diger/332120/Bakan_dan_cevrecilere_savas.html# (accessed 4. February 2014).
10. ‘OMV, Kozluk’ta Anadolu Öğretmen Lisesi inşa ediyor’, Bugün Gazetesi, 18. December 2013,
accessed 16. January 2015. http://www.bugun.com.tr/son-dakika/omv-kozlukta-anadolu-
ogretmen–haberi/902514.
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